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THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: ERIE V. TOMPKINS
David R. Kochery*
The Federal Arbitration Act' confers irrevocability and enforceability
upon written agreements for arbitration which come within its purview.
But the Act contains limitations and exclusions2 with the result that
there is a reasonably broad area in which the provisions of the Act will
not apply, even though a case involving an arbitration clause happens
* See Contributors' section, Masthead, p. 99, for biographical data.
1 The Act was originally enacted in 1925. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1946). It was repealed and
substantially reenacted in 1947. 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (Supp. 1952).
2 The Act is limited to arbitration agreements appearing in contracts "evidencing a
transaction involving commerce" or in "any maritime transaction". 9 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp.
1952). Expressly excluded are arbitration agreements appearing in "contracts of employment
of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1952).
Merely because a dispute arises under a contract with a party engaged in commerce (or
in the production of goods for commerce) does not mean that it is a "contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce" within the Act. See Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries
Co., 49 F. Supp. 843 (M.D. Pa. 1943), reversed on other grounds, 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943)
(an action to recover overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act). See Application
of Susquehanna Collieries Co., 49 F. Supp. 845 (M.D. Pa. 1943). But the mere presence of
a "contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce" will not ground federal jurisdiction.
In addition there must be diversity or a right arising under a law of the United States
plus the proper amount in controversy. San Carlo Opera Co. v. Conley, 72 F. Supp. 825
(S.D.N.Y. 1946), aff'd, 163 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1947); Krauss Bros. Lumber Co. v. Lovuis
Bossert & Sons, Inc., 62 F.2d 1004 (2d Cir. 1933); In re Woerner, 31 F.2d 283 (2d Cir.
1929). For cases applying the Arbitration Act where there is a right arising under a law of
the United States, see notes 57, 59 infra.
For the view that the exclusion of "contracts of employment" does not embrace collective
bargaining agreements, see United Office & Professional Workers, C.I.O. v. Monumental
Life Ins. Co., 88 F. Supp. 602 (ED. Pa. 1950); Lewittes & Sons v. United Furniture
Workers, 95 F. Supp. 851 (S.D. N.Y. 1951). Contra: Amalgamated Ass'n etc. v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951); International Union United Furn. Workers
v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Delaware & Hudson Ry.
v. Williams, 129 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1942); Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir.
1944). Cf. Textile Workers Union of America (C.I.O.) v. American Thread Co., 113 F.
Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953), where judge Wyzanski decreed specific enforcement of an
arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement, holding that such a remedy is
implicit in § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Law [29 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. 1952)]. He then
directed the parties to utilize such forms and procedures as "would be used if this case
fell within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act." 133 F. Supp. at 142.
3 It has been held that the enforcement provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act,
particularly § 3, are not circumscribed by the limitations of § 2 relating to "commerce"
and "admiralty", but that enforcement may be had of any arbitration agreement so long as
the federal court has jurisdiction on grounds of diversity or otherwise. Watkins v. Hudson
Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1945); Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, 142
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to be in a federal court on grounds of diversity. For example, if the
contract in which the arbitration clause appears does not involve either
admiralty or interstate commerce, the Federal Act would not apply even
though the litigation were properly brought in a federal court. Given
diversity jurisdiction in a case where no federal law is involved, the
question then presented is whether to apply local state law on the
revocability and enforceability of arbitration agreements or to apply
the federal "common law". In short, what choice of law does Erie v.
Tompkins4 dictate in this situation?
The opinion has been expressed that the question of the revocability
or enforceability of agreements to arbitrate is "quite remote" from the
Erie requirement that federal courts duplicate state courts in diversity
cases.5 The essence of this statement seems to be that "arbitration" is
a matter relating to "procedure" or "remedy", and perforce Erie v.
Tompkins requires the application in diversity cases of the federal rule
(the "law of the forum") respecting the enforceability and revocability
of the arbitration clause. The federal "common law" rule denies en-
forceability of such executory clauses and permits at-will revocability, 6
F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944) ; Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d. Cir. 1943),
overruling Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184 (D. Del. 1930); Wilson & Co. v.
Fremont Cake & Meal Co., 77 F. Supp. 364 (D. Neb. 1948); Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank
v. Screw Machine Products Co., 73 F. Supp. 578 (E. D. Wis. 1947). Contra: Amalgamated
Ass'n, etc. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 192 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1951), where the third
circuit concluded that its prior broad construction of the Act in the Watkins case was
inconsistent with the intention of Congress. It is submitted that this latter third circuit
decision is by far the better view since the contrary notion effects the almost complete
emasculation of sections 1 and 2 of the Act. The Act is an entity and the various sections
should be construed together. Though leaving much to be desired, the draftsmanship of
the Act is not so shabby as these cases would indicate. See Sturges and Murphy, "Arbitration
Under the United States Arbitration Act," 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 580, 598-604 (1952).
For the purposes of this article, those cases holding contrary to the opinion in Amalgamated
Ass'n, etc. v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, supra, will be considered as supporting a
minority view.
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
5 Sturges and Murphy, supra note 3, at 594. This article is designed to answer some of
the conclusions reached by Dean Sturges and Mr. Murphy with respect to the Erie doctrine
and arbitration.
6 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924); The Atlanten, 252 U.S.
313 (1920); Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall.
445 (U.S. 1874). Cf., with respect to the irrevocability of appraisement clauses, Hamilton v.
Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U.S. 242 (1890); and, with respect to "umpire"
provisions in construction contracts, McCulloch v. Clinch-Mitchell Constr. Co., 71 F.2d 17,
20-21 (8th Cir. 1934) (citing authorities).
After the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act there appeared some mollification of the
"judicial hostility" to arbitration. See, e.g., Wabash R.R. v. American Refrig. Transit Co.,
7 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926).
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while many states have passed statutes rendering arbitration clauses
irrevocable and enforceable.7
With deference, the position which holds that "arbitration" is "pro-
cedure" under the Erie doctrine cannot be supported. It is submitted
that this position is erroneous inasmuch as it seems to be founded on
(1) reliance on somewhat irrelevant pre-Erie decisions; (2) reliance on
dicta in post-Erie decisions in non-diversity cases; and (3) reliance on
a misconception of the policy behind the Erie decision itself.,
The issue thus joined, the following discussion seeks to justify and
defend a "substantive" classification of arbitration in the federal courts
in cases where the Federal Arbitration Act is not applicable and where
there is no federal law involved.
SUBSTANCE V. PROCEDURE: PRE-Erie DECISIONS
Judges, for better or for worse, are often forced to make some
distinction between "substance" and "procedure".9 The need for making
the distinction arises in attempting to administer a broader policy or
purpose. These purposes may be quite varied, e.g., fairness to litigants,
judicial administrative convenience, uniformity of decision (nation-wide
or state-wide), etc. Where the purpose varies from case to case,
it is not surprising to discover that the "substance" or "procedure"
characterization also changes. A common example in this area is "burden
of proof". The burden of proving contributory negligence is procedural
In reporting out the Federal Arbitration Bill, the Senate Committee stated:
But it is very old law that the performance of a written agreement to arbitrate would
not be enforced in equity, and that if an action at law were brought on the contract
containing the agreement to arbitrate, such agreement could not be pleaded in bar of
the action; nor would such an agreement be ground for a stay of proceedings until
arbitration was had. Further, the agreement was subject to revocation by either party
at any time before the award.
Sen. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924).
For discussion of the history and background of the common law rule, see judge Frank
in Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942);
Judge Peterson, dissenting, in Park Construction Co. v. Ind. School Dist., 209 Minn. 182,
296 N.W. 475 (1941).
7 The Federal Act itself, rendering arbitration agreements irrevocable and enforceable,
was patterned after the New York Arbitration Act. See Sen. Rep. No. 536, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1924). In addition, the Federal Act is quite similar to the arbitration statutes of
,California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin.
8 This paper is not designed either as a defense of or an attack upon the Erie doctrine.
By hedging thus, the writer escapes any necessity of attempting to cope with Professor
-Crosskey's stimulating discussion. 2 Crosskey, Politics and the Constitution 912-937 (1953).
9 Judge Learned Hand opined that the duty of making such a distinction might better
be left to the labors of professional philosophers. Aktieselskabet K.F.K. v. Red. Atlanten,
232 Fed. 403, 405-406 (S.D.N.Y. 1916). See note 25 infra.
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in most cases involving federal pleading ° (judicial convenience, nation-
wide uniformity), but it becomes substantive where local law shifts the
burden from the defendant to the plaintiff' (fairness to litigants, state-
wide uniformity). When the question is whether a statute is constitutional
which shifts the burden of proof on the issue of contributory negligence
from the plaintiff to the defendant and operates retroactively, the statute
has been held procedural 2 (fairness to litigants); but where a state court
is hearing a case involving an action against an interstate carrier, the
matter of burden of proof is labeled substantive and the federal rule is
applied 3 (nation-wide uniformity).
What of arbitration? "Arbitration, rightly or wrongly, has long been
considered procedural."' 4 Heckers v. Fowlera5 involved an action to
recover damages for breach of covenant. While the case was pending
the parties agreed to refer all the issues in dispute to a referee and
requested the court to order such reference. This was done. The award
of the referee was immediately entered as a judgment of the court.
Defendants appealed on the ground that such a reference was beyond
the power of the federal court since there was no Act of Congress which
conferred such authority. In affirming the decision of the lower court
the Supreme Court said:
Scope of the objection has respect to the mode of trial as substituting
the report of a referee for the verdict of a jury. Circuit Courts, as well as
all other Federal Courts, have authority-to make and establish all necessary
rules for the orderly conducting of business in the said courts, provided
such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States. Practice of
referring pending actions is coeval with the organization of our judicial
system, and the defendants do not venture the suggestion that the practice
is repugnant to any act of Congress. On the contrary, . .. a trial by
arbitrators, appointed by the court, with the consent of the parties, was
one of the modes of prosecuting a suit to judgment as well established and
as fully warranted by law as by equity ....16
No one would dispute the fact that it is "procedure" when a court grants
an uncontested motion to refer. to arbitrators rather than to submit the
issues to a jury, just as no one would dispute the fact that a particular
system of pleading facts may be "procedural" for most purposes. But
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c); Indianapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Horst, 93 U.S. 291 (1876).
31 Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), Soule v. Chicago & N.W. R.R., 175 F.2d 424
(7th Cir. 1949).
12 Sackheim v. Pigueron, 215 N.Y. 62, 109 N.E. 109 (1915).
3. Barnett v. N.Y. Cent. & H. R.R., 222 N.Y. 235, 111 N.E. 837 (1916).
14 5 Moore, Federal Practice 128 (2d ed. 1948).
15 2 Wall. 123 (U.S. 1864).
16 Id. at 128.
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is it procedural for all purposes when two contracting parties mutually
promise that, in case of a future dispute, all issues shall be determined
by certain arbitrators? Is the law "procedural" which provides that these
parties may freely revoke their promises? Or is it only the method of
enforcement that is procedural? In short, is there not a distinction
between (a) the law on revocability and (b) the law providing machinery
to enforce a promise? The federal courts have never made this distinction.
Whether referring to the law on revocability or to the enforcement
machinery, the federal courts have always held that arbitration is a
question of "general law", or, later, that it relates to "remedy" or
"procedure".
As stated above, the "procedure" characterization made in Heckers v.
Fowler is defensible since that particular arbitration was under rule of
court and related to the mode or sequence of trial. Between the decision
in Heckers v. Fowler in 1864, and the year 1924, when Red Cross Line v.
Atlantic Fruit Co.17 was decided, the Supreme Court made no determina-
tion on the characterization to be given to agreements to arbitrate.'8
The trend in the lower federal courts, however, was to treat any and
all arbitration issues as questions of "general law" to be determined by
the law of the federal courts. This was true whether the case was in
admiralty or otherwise. 9 Most of these cases were diversity cases, and
it is submitted that the "general law" characterization made therein
smacks strongly of the Swift v. Tyson20 decision that federal courts
sitting in diversity cases were not bound by state decision on questions
of "general law", whether of the conflict of laws, equity jurisprudence,
general commercial law, general tort law, et al. These early diversity
cases involved arbitration agreements and conflict of laws problems-
the latter clearly a question of "general law" under Swift v. Tyson.
17 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
18 Although the Court had held that arbitration agreements were freely revocable. See
Insurance Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (U.S. 1874). And see The Atlanten, 252 U.S. 313
(1920).
19 Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 Fed. 639, 645 (3d Cir. 1898) (diversity); Jefferson Fire
Ins. Co. v. Bierce & Sage, 183 Fed. 588, 591 (E.D. Mich. 1910) (diversity); Haskell v.
McCintic-Marshall Co., 289 Fed. 405, 410 (9th Cir. 1923) (diversity); Aktieselskabet
K.F.K. v. Red. Atlanten, 250 Fed. 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1918) (admiralty).
20 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842). Swift v. Tyson held that, in diversity cases, questions of general
commercial law were questions of "general law." Later cases held that "general law" also
included questions of general tort law, non-statutory public policy, conflict of laws, general
equity jurisprudence, and general damages, all of which appear to relate to matters of
substance. Hough v. Ry., 100 U.S. 213 (1879) (fellow servant rule); Black & White Taxicab
Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) (state public policy on restraints
of trade not applicable in federal court); Greaves v. Neal, 57 Fed. 816 (D. Mass. 1893)
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By labeling the question of arbitration one of "general law" the court
was not necessarily referring to "procedure" at all." If the courts had
intended to call it "procedure" in. order to apply federal law they could
have done so simply by holding that federal courts sitting in equity are
not bound by the procedures of state court under the Conformity Act.'
This is particularly well borne out by the decision in Rae v. Luzerne
Countyns which, belatedly (1932), applied the "general law" charac-
terization. The action was one to recover damages for breach of contract.
The defense was a plea in bar, alleging the arbitration clause barred the
action. The action was one wholly at law. If the question of the
revocability of arbitration agreements was truly a question of procedure,
the Conformity Act would seem to have required the application of state
law.' However, the court determined that it was a question of "general
law" and the decisions of the federal courts were controlling. Likewise,
in a libel in admiralty, the court referred to New York decisions holding
arbitration agreements enforceable, then stated:
The question here presented being one of general law, the decisions of the
Court of Appeals of the State of New York are not binding upon the
federal courts. (Emphasis added.)25
(conflict of laws); Lake Shore & Michigan R.R. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893) (general
damages not governed by state law). See also Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1915).
21 See Sturges and Murphy, supra note 3, at 590 and n. 19.
22 The Conformity Act, 17 Stat. 196 (1872), 28 U.S.C. § 724 (1946) provided:
That the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in other than equity
and admiralty causes in the circuit and district courts of the United States shall conform,
as near as may be, to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding
existing at the time in like causes in the courts of record of the state within which
such circuit or district courts are held, any rule of court to the contrary notwithstanding:
Provided, however, That nothing herein contained shall alter the rules of evidence
under the laws of the United States, and as practiced in the courts thereof.
The Conformity Act is generally thought to have been repealed by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941); 2 Moore, op. cit. supra, note 14
at 6-8.
The diversity cases cited note 19 supra, were in equity.
23 58 F.2d 829 (N.D. Pa. 1932). See Mitchell v. Dougherty, 90 Fed. 639 (3d Cir. 1898).
24 This type of "procedure" would not seem to come within any of the recognized
exceptions to that Act. See Nudd v. Barrows, 91 U.S. 426 (1875) (matters of personal
conduct of the judge); United States v. Reading Ry., 123 U.S. 113 (1887) (commenting
on the evidence).
25 Aktieselskabet K.F.K. v. Red. Atlanten, 250 Fed. 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1918) (noting,
inter alia, that the New York court had held arbitration to relate to "remedy"). The
district court had held that arbitration was both a question of "general" law as well as a
question of remedy, citing New York decisional law. 232 Fed. 403, 405, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
On appeal to the Supreme Court [The Atlanten, 252 U.S. 313 (1919)], it appears that all
the various characterizations made by the lower courts were needless since the Supreme
Court held that the dispute was not referable to arbitration under the contract anyway.
11... we agree that the refusal was not a 'dispute' of the kind referred to in the arbitration
clause." 252 U.S. at 315.
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If the question were one of "procedure" the court, sitting in admiralty,
could likewise simply have stated that the Conformity Act does not
apply to cases in admiralty. 6
It is to be noted that all the cases thus far discussed involved the
question of whether the federal court should apply a state rule or the
federal rule on the revocability of arbitration agreements. The general
purpose in all cases was to establish nation-wide uniformity of decision.
The choice was federal law, not because the question was one of
"procedure" at all, but because it was a question of "general law".
And "general law", in the light of Swift v. Tyson and the Conformity
Act, seems to sound more in "substance" than in "procedure". It is
submitted that these cases exemplified the general trend in diversity suits
in the federal courts prior to 1924. This trend was not toward a
"procedure" classification.
There were, on the other hand, federal court decisions prior to 1924
which characterized arbitration as relating to "remedy" rather than to
"general law"; but they were cases in admiralty rather than diversity,
and they involved either a conflict of laws characterization or a charac-
terization for purposes of applying federal law rather than state law in
admiralty.27 In the latter situation (admiralty), a "remedy" classification
was not necessary to the result since, in order to create uniformity of
decision in cases in admiralty, the federal court necessarily relies on
"general" federal admiralty law, not state law.28 In the former class of
cases (conflict of laws) the federal courts relied on a concurring opinion
of Judge Cardozo in Meackam v. Jamestown Franklin & Clearfield Ry.,'2
a New York decision. In this concurring opinion a "remedy" classification
appeared for the first time in any court in the United States. The
Meackam case had involved the application of Pennsylvania law to the
enforcement in a New York court of an arbitration agreement appearing
in a Pennsylvania contract. The majority of the court refused to enforce
the arbitration agreement according to Pennsylvania law not on the
26 See note 22 supra.
27 Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 5 F.2d 218, 219 (2d Cir. 1924); The Eros, 241
Fed. 186 (E.D.N.Y. 1916), aff'd, 251 Fed. 45 (2d Cir. 1918); United States Asphalt Refining
Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petrol. Co., 222 Fed. 1006, 1011 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
28 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1926); Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker,
244 U.S. 255 (1917); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917);-The Loccawana,
21 Wall. 558 (U.S. 1874); The Betsey, 3 DalI. 6 (U.S. 1794). And, more recently, Levinson
v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 88 (1945); Hawn
v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 198 F.2d 800 (3d Cir. 1951).
29 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914).
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ground of a "remedy" classification, but on the ground of "public
policy":
Notwithstanding the decisions of the courts of Pennsylvania that the
contract as to arbitration was valid and enforceable in that state, judicial
comity does not require us to hold that such provisions of a contract which
is contrary to a declared policy of our courts . . . shall be enforced as
between non-residents of our jurisdiction. 0
Judge Cardozo, however, in concurring, stated:
An agreement that all differences arising under a contract shall be
submitted to arbitration relates to the law of remedies, and the law that
governs remedies is the law of the forum. . . . Such a contract, whatever
form it may assume affects in its operation the remedy alone.31
No authority was cited in support of this statement. Indeed there was
none available. And Judge Cardozo failed to distinguish between that
Pennsylvania law which imposed on the parties a duty not to revoke
and that Pennsylvania law which provided a method for enforcement of
the right to proceed to arbitration.' Thus an irrevocable right in
Pennsylvania became a revocable right in New York. The method
provided for enforcement concededly may relate to "remedy", but it is
submitted that the rights and duties established respecting revocability
relate to "substance".ns In any event, the "remedy" characterization in
the Meacham case by Judge Cardozo, and in the federal cases following
that opinion, involving as they did a non-diversity conflict of laws
'characterization, are shaky precedents when a characterization must be
made in a case under federal diversity jurisdiction.
Finally, in 1924, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co 4 There, parties to a contract had
been denied an application for an order to proceed to arbitration under
the New York arbitration Act in the Court of Appeals of that state,35
and that decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Cpurt. The
question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the New York
Supreme Court could enforce an arbitration clause by a general order
to proceed under the New York arbitration statute notwithstanding the
controversy arose within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States. The New York Court of Appeals itself felt
that such an order would be unconstitutional:
30 Id. at 351-352, 105 N.E. at 655.
31 Id. at 352, 105 N.E. at 655.
32 on Pennsylvania arbitration decisions, see Sturges and Ives, "Some Confusing Matters
Relating to Arbitration in Pennsylvania," 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 727 (1951).
83 For further discussion of this point, see pp. 86 to 98 infra.
34 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
35 233 N.Y. 373, 135 N.E. 821 (1922).
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... a reading of the whole opinion shows that the state court excluded
maritime contracts from the operation of the law, not as a matter of
statutory construction, but because it thought the Federal Constitution
required such action. 6
And the New York Court of Appeals was of the opinion that such
application of the New York Act was unconstitutional despite its own
prior characterization that the New York Arbitration Act related only
to "remedy" in the leading case of Matter of Berkowitz v. Arbib &
Holberg.7 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court held the New York
Act constitutional. First of all, arbitration contracts are valid in admiralty
courts-they just are not enforced:
The substantive right created by the agreement to submit disputes to
arbitration is recognized as a perfect obligation.
38
Although none of the cases cited for this proposition mentioned anything
of the sort, it is believed that the court referred to the fact that a refusal
to perform an arbitration agreement created a cause of action for nominal
damages." An award of merely nominal damages, it is submitted, is
hardly a vindication of a "substantive right", and it is unconvincing to
assert that such an agreement is "recognized as a perfect obligation."
The Supreme Court stated further:
36 264 U.S. 109 at 120 (1924).
37 230 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921). The constitutionality of the New York Act was
upheld. The Act had been attacked because of its retroactive application. Whereas, in the
Meacham case, supra note 29, Judge Cardozo had been the only member of the court to
label arbitration as "remedy," he had by now convinced all his colleagues that his was the
correct characterization. Since the Act related only to remedy, the retroactive application
was constitutional:
The common-law limitation upon the enforcement of promises to arbitrate is part
of the law of remedies ... The rule to be applied is the rule of the forum [citing his
own concurring opinion in the Meacham case]. Both in this court and elsewhere the
law has been so declared [relying on his own former concurring opinion and on two
federal cases which in turn relied on his concurring opinion]. Arbitration is a form of
procedure whereby differences may be settled. It is not a definition of the rights and
wrongs out of which differences may be settled. This statute did not attach a new
obligation to sales already made. It vindicated by a new method the obligation then
existing. 230 N.Y. at 270, 130 N.E. at 289, 290.
By assuming that promises to arbitrate were already enforceable in New York (by awarding
nominal damages) the court obviously felt that the Act merely created a new way of
enforcing them. Thus was a "remedy" characterization made for the purpose of declaring
constitutional retroactive legislation. The precedents relied upon had made the characterization
for the purpose of the' conflict of laws. In labeling arbitration "remedy" for any and all
purposes Judge Cardozo would seem to be violating his own counsel against "the extension
of a maxim or a definition with relentless disregard of the consequences to a 'dryly logical
extreme'." Hynes v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. 231 N.Y. 229, 235, 131 N.E. 989, 900 (1921) [quoting
from Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence," 8 Col. L. Rev. 605, 608 (1906)].
38 264 U.S. at 123.
39 Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890); Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S. Co.,
99 Fed. 787 (S.D.N.Y. 1900), aff'd, 100 Fed.. 1005 (2d Cir. 1901).
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The arbitration law [i.e., the New York Act] deals merely with the remedy
in the state courts in respect of obligations voluntarily and lawfully in-
curred. It does not attempt to modify the substantive maritime law or
to deal with the remedy in the courts of admiralty.
40
The transformation of a revocable right (in a federal admiralty court)
to one that is irrevocable (in a New York court) clearly seems to go to
substance rather than merely to remedy. Thus the Supreme Court should
have declared the New York Act unconstitutional as applied to cases in
admiralty, just as the New York Court of Appeals had done.4 1 The
Court's characterization of the New York Act as one relating to "remedy"
was the result of Judge Cardozo's prior characterization of the same
Act.' The Supreme Court's reliance on Judge Cardozo's characterization
is particularly questionable when it is considered that the characterization
made by Cardozo was for an entirely different purpose (retroactive
legislation) than the purpose involved in the Red Cross Line case. And,
notwithstanding the opinion of the Court, this decision must be deemed
to interfere with the "uniformity doctrine" as established by the Supreme
Court itself in admiralty.43
Thus, for the first time, the Supreme Court determined that arbitration
referred wholly to "remedy". Only one other time has the Court been
faced with the problem of making the characterization. In Marine
Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus" the question before the court was the con-
stitutionality of the Federal Arbitration Act. It was contended that the
Act was invalid as extending the federal judicial power in admiralty in
violation of Article III of the Constitution. More narrowly defined, the
sole question before the court was as follows: since, prior to the Act,
an admiralty court did not have the power to grant an injunction or
any other equitable relief,5 were the enforcement provisions of the Act
(Section 4 in this case) which gave the court that power for the first
time constitutional? The Court's answer was in the affirmative, as it
should have been. It is submitted that the new power which the Act
gave to an admiralty court is purely a new remedy, or procedure, and
therefore the following language of the Court cannot be disputed:
The general power of the Congress to provide remedies in matters falling
40 264 U.S. at 124.
41 See note 35 supra.
42 See note 37 supra.
43 In suits under the admiralty "saving to suitors" clause, the desirability of nation-wide
uniformity generally requires the applicatitn of "general federal law." See cases cited note 28
supra.
44 284 U.S. 263 (1932).
45 Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 123 (1924) (citing cases).
46 284 U.S. at 278.
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within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, is indisputable ...
it is well established that the Congress, in providing appropriate means to
enforce obligations cognizable in admiralty, may draw upon other
systems....46
Note that the decision does not hold that Section 2 of the Act, making
arbitration agreements irrevocable, is "procedural" or "remedial". The
Court only refers to the enforcement provisions of Section 4.
The Supreme Court has never yet determined whether a provision
of a state statute or local common law relating only to the revocability
of arbitration agreements is "procedural" or "substantive" in a case
arising under diversity jurisdiction. What effect has the Supreme Court's
"remedy" classifications of arbitration had on non-admiralty diversity
cases in the lower federal courts? As stated above, every diversity case
decided prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in the Red Cross Line
case (1924) characterized arbitration as relating to a question of "general
law" and thus applied the federal rule on revocability and enforceability.
To repeat, such characterization seems to smack more of substance than
of procedure. All pre-1924 federal' decisions characterizing arbitration as
"remedy" were non-diversity cases. Between 1924 and 1938, when
Erie v. Tompkins47 was decided, only one court of appeals has
spoken on the problem-the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit-
and two district courts. All these cases were under diversity jurisdiction,
but in only one of them was federal law applied on the ground of a
"procedure" characterization of arbitration. That case was California
Prune & Apricot Growers Ass'n v. Catz American Co." where the court
relied heavily on the decision of the New York court in the Berkowitz
case49 and characterized the arbitration clause involved as relating to
"procedure". In denying petitioner's request for an order to proceed to
arbitration under the California Arbitration Act, the court said:
The [agreement for arbitration] . . . was merely a method of procedure
adopted by the parties for settlement of controversies arising thereunder,
without litigation.50
Once the problem was classified as "remedial", and since the suit was
in equity, the court then was free to refuse to apply state statutory law
under the then-established doctrine of Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen.5 '
Thus the court declared:
47 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
48 60 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1932).
49 See note 37 supra.
50 60 F.2d at 790.
51 261 U.S. 491 (1923) (state law cannot enlarge the equity jurisdiction of a federal
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The law that governs in the matter of remedy is the law of the forum
and no other. The courts are without jurisdiction or power to enforce a
purely remedial or procedural state law.52
It is worthy of note that a prior Ninth Circuit opinion had applied the
California Act (by granting a stay of proceedings pending arbitration)
but without discussion of the procedure-substance problem 3
Other than the Ninth Circuit cases mentioned above only two other
cases, both in district courts, have passed on the problem of classifying
arbitration clauses in diversity cases. In both cases the federal rule of
revocability was applied, but in neither case was the decision grounded
on a "remedy" classification. In Lappe v. Wilcox" the grounds for
refusing to apply state law were (a) that the New York Arbitration Act
could not deprive non-residents of recourse to the New York federal
courts and (b) that the provisions of the New York Act do not mention
that they are to be applied by any other than the New York courts.
In Rae v. Luzerne Count?,5 the federal rule was applied on the ground
that the arbitration clause related to a question of "general law" which,
as has been stated herein, is not necessarily the same as "procedure".
A review of federal court decisions (and the New York decision relied
on so heavily) which have classified arbitration as "remedy" or "pro-
cedure" prior to 1938 discloses that the classifications have been for the
following varied purposes:
(1) For the purpose of the conflict of laws (three cases).
(2) For the purpose of giving retroactive effect to legislation (one case).
(3) For the purpose of declaring a state law constitutional as not
infringing upon federal admiralty jurisdiction (one case).
(4) For the purpose of declaring a federal statute constitutional as not
extending the judicial power of the United States under the Con-
stitution (one case).
(5) For the purpose of diversity jurisdiction (one case).
(6) For the purpose of applying general admiralty law (two cases).
It is to be noted that, with but one exception, all diversity cases prior to
Erie v. Tompkins had characterized arbitration as relating to "general
law", not to "remedy" or "procedure". It is submitted that a "remedy"
classification was properly made only in the case coming under (4),
above, since in that case (Dreyfus) the Court was referring only to the
machinery for the enforcement of rights, and was not referring to the
court. Herein, a state statute had given the chancellor power to appoint a receiver on
request of an unsecured corporation creditor). See note 102 infra.
52 60 F.2d at 793.
53 Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 25 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1928).
54 14 F.2d 861 (N.D.N.Y. 1926).
55 58 F.2d 829 (NJ). Pa. 1932). See note 23 supra.
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revocable or irrevocable rights themselves. Where a "remedy" charac-
terization was used in the remaining sub-headings above, the characteriza-
tion was erroneous. In those cases the courts failed to distinguish between
(1) the right to revoke, or the right to be free from revocation, and (2)
the method of enforcing a right.
The Supreme Court has never yet, either before or after Erie v.
Tompkins, made a characterization of arbitration in a case arising under
the diversity jurisdiction. How have the lower federal courts handled
the problem since the Erie decision?
ARBiT ATION AND Erie v. Tompkins
Some of the arbitration cases after Erie v. To'mpkins, though involving
diversity jurisdiction, also involved an arbitration agreement in a contract
involving admiralty or commerce so that the enforcement provisions of
the Federal Arbitration Act would automatically apply. Cases in this
category which might have labeled arbitration as a matter of "remedy",
to be governed by the law of the forum, must be deemed to have done
so gratuitously."6 The "law of the forum" should be applied anyway-
not because it was a matter of "remedy", but because Congress had
occupied the field. In the federal cases where the Federal Act admittedly
was not applicable, because the contract did not involve either admiralty
or commerce, substantial difficulty is encountered in attempting to de-
termine on what grounds federal jurisdiction is based. The cases simply
do not make it clear. The reason for the difficulty is that, since 1938,
many of the arbitration cases involve a recovery sought under one or
more of various federal acts-e.g., FLSA, LMRA, etc. 7 The courts
neglect to say whether jurisdiction is based on diversity or the federal
question. However that may be, even if a federal question case also
contains diversity of citizenship, it seems clear that federal courts are
not bound to apply local substantive law under the Erie doctrine. The
desire for nation-wide uniformity of decision under the particular federal
statute involved is paramount to the desire for conformity which would
ordinarily be required by Erie58 Thus, where a case involves an
56 The following cases seem to fall within this category: Hudson Lumber Co. v. U.S.
Plywood Corp., 181 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1950); Murray Oil Co. v. Mitsui & Co., 146 F.2d
381 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Parry v. Bache, 125 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Wilson & Co. v. Fremont,
77 F. Supp. 364 (D. Neb. 1948).
57 See Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1953) (Securities Act); Int. Union United
Furn. Workers v. Colonial Hardwood Flooring Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948) (LMRA);
Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944) (FLSA); Agostini Bldg. Corp. v.
United States, 142 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1944) (Miller Act); Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries
Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943) (FLSA).
58 Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (jurisdiction originally
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arbitration clause which does not comply with the Fedetal Arbitration
Act, and the action is based on another federal statute, the presence or
absence of diversity should make no difference-the federal rule, whether
one labels it substantive or procedural, should govern the case. Therefore,
any statement in such cases relating arbitration to "remedy" or "pro-
cedure" are, again, pure superfluity5
There are very few cases involving arbitration since Erie where federal
jurisdiction seems truly to have been based solely on diversity. At least
two of those cases are somewhat less than conclusive authority inasmuch
as they involved the confirmation of an arbitration award already rendered
in the state. They did not involve the question of the revocability of the
arbitration agreement prior to the award. In the first case, Tejas Develop-
ment Co. v. McGough Bros.,10 the Fifth Circuit held that the validity of
the award should be tested according to the law of the State of Texas,
since it involved a question of substance. The court also used some
other language, however, which may indicate a trend in that circuit:
[The questions are] the validity of the award and the binding effect of the
agreement to arbitrate, both of which are matters of State substantive
law, since contract and arbitrament arose under state law. . . . so the
effect of their general agreement to arbitrate, their submissions of the
particular disputes, and the awards, stand under the common law as
generally applied in the United States, with special reference to the
decisions in Texas. (Emphasis added.)
61
The causes for attacking the validity of the award, as the Texas court
held, should be state causes, not federal. This kind of case involves a
contest between a state court and a federal court so that even the most
enthusiastic supporters of the non-Erie character of arbitration should
agree with the result.' The same question was presented in United Fuel
Gas Co. v. Columbian Fuel Corp." There, again, the question presented
to the court was the confirmation of an award which had already been
based on diversity, but federal "common law" is applied to determine how far a patentee
may go in price-fixing). See note 59 infra.
59 The following cases seem to fall within this category: Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d
876 (6th Cir. 1944) (apparently applying Kentucky law despite its reference to "remedy,"
142 F.2d at 881); Boston & Maine R.R. v. Amalgamated Ass'n, etc. of America, 106 F. Supp.
334 (D. Mass. 1952); Voutrey v. General Baking Co., 39 F. Supp. 974 (El). Pa. 1941).
See Motor Terminals v. National Car Co., 92 F. Supp. 155, 162 (D. Del. 1949) where
the Federal Act is not mentioned, and it is difficult to tell whether the court applies federal
or state law when refusing to honor the arbitration clause.
60 165 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1947).
6i Id. at 279. Accord, In re Strassburger, 12 F. Supp. 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1935) (applying
New York law).
62 As indeed they do. See Sturges and Murphy, supra note 3, at 594 n. 32.
63 165 F.2d 746 (4th Cir. 1948).
1953]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
rendered in a state arbitral proceeding according to the agreement of
the parties. The agreement provided that the award was to be enforced
according to the provisions of the West Virginia Arbitration Act. After
stating that a federal court had power to enforce an award in equity,
the court confirmed the award, citing West Virginia decisions.
The cases discussed above are somewhat irrelevant to the question at
hand inasmuch as they involve the enforcement of an award rather than
the enforcement of the executory agreement itself. On the other hand, in
two district court cases since the Erie decision, the question of the
revocability of arbitration agreements has been held to be "procedural"
under diversity jurisdiction. In Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Fremont Cake
& Meal Co.,4 the plaintiff sued for damages resulting from defendant's
alleged breach of a contract for the sale and delivery of soybean oil.
Federal jurisdiction was grounded on diversity. In granting defendant's
motion to stay the action pending arbitration as provided in the contract,
the district court discussed the applicability of the Federal Arbitration
Act. To plaintiff's argument that the arbitration agreement was not
in a contract evidencing "a transaction involving commerce" the court
held:
Appraising the contract in its entirety, the court is of the opinion that
it does evidence "a transaction involving commerce." And if that view
be correct the plaintiff's negation of the applicability of Title 9 U.S.C.A.
§ 3 necessarily fails. 6
5
As stated previously, if the contract does involve commerce and the
action is in the federal court on grounds of diversity or otherwise, then
there arises no question of the choice of law. The federal law applies
because Congress has occupied the field.66 But the court in the Wilson &
Co. case went further. Even if the contract in question did not evidence
"a transaction involving commerce" within Section 2 of the Act, still
Section 3 of the Act is not thereby limited in its operation. After
discussing prior authorities, the court concluded:
Considering the several reported opinions upon the issue, and especially
the statute itself, this court, by way of conclusion, is inclined to the opinion
that the stay provisions of Section 3 are not limited to cases resting upon
maritime transactions or upon contracts evidencing transaction involving
commerce. 67
64 77 F. Supp. 364 (D. Neb. 1948).
65 Id. at 374.
66 Text supported by note 56 supra and note 67 infra.
67 77 F. Supp. at 379.
Where jurisdiction is based on a right under a federal law, it is generally considered that
uniformity of decision on a nation-wide basis is desirable. This uniformity should go, not
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Thereupon the court determined that the local state law on agreements
to arbitrate was inapplicable since "the issue is one of procedure":
To the contention that the laws of Nebraska upon the subject of agreements
to arbitrate already concluded, the parties have agreed upon arbitration
and the case is one in which Title 9 U.S.C.A. § 3 applies, then the issue
is one of procedure, not of substantive right, and Nebraska's laws are
neither controlling nor even instructive.68
The court's conclusion that Section 3 of the Act is not limited by Section
2 is of doubtful validity. 9 But, assuming the court was correct on that
point, the additional conclusion that Section 3 applies regardless of
state law on the validity or revocability of the arbitration agreement is
of questionable merit. Such a conclusion has the result of conferring
upon Congress the power to regulate purely intrastate agreements by
declaring that they are irrevocable. Whether Congress has the power
to legislate upon the validity of contracts generally is highly doubtful.7"
Since 1938, only one other district court, sitting in diversity, has
classified arbitration as relating to "procedure" and has applied the
federal law on revocability and enforceability. In Pioneer Trust &
Savings Bank v. Screw Machine Products Co.,71 plaintiff sued to recover
minimum royalty payments pursuant to a license agreement. The
action was brought in a Wisconsin district court. Plaintiff was an Illinois
corporation; defendant was a Wisconsin corporation. Even under the
patent laws an action for royalties will not ground federal jurisdiction,"
therefore it must be assumed that the action was brought under diversity
jurisdiction. It is not made clear whether the contract evidenced "a
transaction involving commerce" within the Federal Arbitration Act, but
the court indicated that Section 3 of the Act would apply anyway,7 3 and
only to the interpretation of the particular statute involved, but also to the closing in of
gaps by interstitial decision. Thus federal law is applied, not state law. See Dice v. Akron,
C. & Y. R. R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (validity of a release under F.E.L.. to be determined
by federal law); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949) (negligence -under F.E.L.A. to be
determined by federal law); MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 329 U.S. 402
(1947) (price fixing covenant in a patent contract not subject to state law of estoppel or
severability but to federal law under the Clayton Act); N.L.R.1. v. Hearst Publications,
322 U.S. 111 (1944) (the meaning of "employee" as used in N.L.R.A. to be determined by
federal, not state, law).
68 Ibid.
69 See note 3 supra.
70 See text supported by notes 97-99 infra.
71 73 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Wis. 1947).
72 MacGregor v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co., 45 F. Supp. 236 (W.D. Pa. 1942),
aff'd, 130 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1942).
73 The court cited and quoted from Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States, and
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., cited at notes 2, 57 supra.
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the motion to stay the action pending arbitration was granted. Plaintiff
argued that the district court should apply Illinois law on agreements to
arbitrate since the contract provided that "this contract shall be inter-
preted under the laws of the State of Illinois," and Illinois holds
executory agreements to arbitrate invalid.' But the district court applied
federal law since arbitration agreements relate to the law of remedies:
This court is not required to apply the law of Illinois as to arbitration.
Arbitration agreements relate to the law of remedies and their enforcement
is a question of remedy to be determined by the law of the forum.75
Questions of the conflict of laws are "substantive" as to non-federal
matters under Erie;76 but the court in the Pioneer case made no reference
at all to the conflicts rule on arbitration of the state of Wisconsin, where
the court was sitting. And, as in the Wilson & Co. case, the court is
conferring upon Congress a power to legislate upon the validity of
contracts generally, a power generally thought to be within the domain
of the states.
Prior td the decision in Erie v. Tompkins, when nation-wide uniformity
of decision was the vogue, diversity cases involving agreements to arbi-
trate classified those agreements as relating to "general law" and the
federal rule was applied."' Subsequent to the Erie decision the two
diversity cases discussed above employed a "remedy" classification and
continued to apply the federal rule. Thus, under the "remedy" label,
uniformity of decision in .arbitration cases continues despite the Erie
decision and its emphasis on conformity.
What is the policy behind the Rules of Decision Act as interpreted by
Erie v. Tompkins? That policy is deemed to be as follows:
There are many difficulties in allocating authority between two
sovereign and largely competitive judicial systems operating within the
same national framework. In order to attempt to balance the conflicts
between state's rights and federal power it is thought that a federal
court should choose and apply the state's substantive law in a case
which could just as easily have been tried in a state court except for
the facts of diversity of citizenship of the parties. And one facet of the
whole problem is the determination of what is substantive and what is
74 73 F. Supp. at 580.
75 Ibid.
76 Williams v. Green Bay & W. R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). And see Silving, "Erie
and the Law of Conflict," 31 Iowa L. Rev. 330 (1946); Wolkin, "Conflict of Laws in the
Federal Courts: The Erie Era," 94 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 93 (1946).
77 See notes 19-27 supra.
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procedural.78 Since the state "laws" which were to govern cases in
federal courts were not defined by the Rules of Decision Act, Swift v.
Tyson had undertaken to define those "laws" for the federal courts
sitting in diversity cases. That case confined the state "laws" which
must be applied in diversity cases to the constitutions, statutes, and
decisions of state courts interpreting them; and to those other state
decisions relating to "matters immovable and intraterritorial in their
nature and character." The result of that decision was to leave the
federal courts free to apply a federal "general law" to a vast area of
cases, resulting in a substantial nation-wide uniformity of decision.
Whether because of various unfortunate decisions 9 resulting from a
too-rigid application of Swift v. Tyson,"0 or because of some belief that
Swift v. Tyson involved an unconstitutional assumption of power by the
federal courts,"' it became generally felt that the rule of that case was
not carrying out the general purpose and policy intended, viz., the
balancing of the conflicting interests between state's rights and federal
powers and between two sovereign judicial systems. Thus, in Erie v.
Tompkins, the Supreme Court disapproved Swift v. Tyson's application
of the Rules of Decision Act, and began a new era the general goal of
which in diversity cases was state-wide uniformity of decision rather than
nation-wide uniformity. Erie thus determined that, in diversity cases,
federal courts were bound to apply all state rules of substantive law as
to non-federal matters. Swift v. Tyson was held to be historically
unsound, impolitic, and an unconstitutional assumption of power by the
courts of the United States. But further:
... [Erie] did not merely overrule a venerable case. It overruled a particu-
lar way of looking at law which dominated the judicial process long after its
inadequacies had been lain bare.... a federal court adjudicating a state-
created right solely because of diversity of citizenship of the parties is for
that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State .... Erie R. Co. v.
Tomnpkins was not an endeavor to formulate scientific legal terminology.
It expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of judicial
power between State and federal courts .... The nub of the policy that
underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the
accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of
78 For illustrative discussions, see, Farinholt, "Angel v. Bullington; Twilight of Diversity
Jurisdiction," 26 N.C.L. Rev. 29 (1947); Rawlings, "Angel v. Bulllngton and Diversity
Jurisdiction," 33 Va. L. Rev. 739 (1947); Clark, "State Law in the Federal Courts; The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins," 55 Yale L. J. 267 (1946); Moore, Commentary
on the Judicial Code 315-359 (1949).
79 E.g., Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Yellow & Brown Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
80 16 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1842).
81 Holmes, dissenting in the Black & White Taxikab Co. v. Yellow & Brown Taxicab Co.
case, 276 U.S. at 532.
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in a State court a block away, should not lead to a substantially different
result.
82
Whatever may have been, or may be, a particular classification in
terms of substance or procedure for other purposes, it is "substantive"
under the Erie doctrine whenever its application will prevent a "substan-
tially different result" from that which might have been reached by a
state court had the suit been litigated there. Matters of "remedy" and
matters of "substance" are mere "abstractions" until measured against
the purpose of the Erie decision. Further:
. . . the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases where a
federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of
citizenship of the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the
outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.
8 3
So much for the general policy behind Erie v. Tompkins. It may be
noted, in passing, that the year 1938, when Erie was decided, was also
the year of the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,84 which
effected the substantial repeal of the Conformity Act.' How should a
question involving the revocability or enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate fit into this new era? Assume an action for breach of contract
pending in a federal court with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizen-
ship, with no federal law involved, and where there is an arbitration
clause which does not fall within the Federal Act. Assume also, that had
the case been tried in the state court, the arbitration clause would not be
enforced and would not be pleadable in bar under state law, and, that
the federal rule is that the federal court will grant an injunction of the
legal action for damages pending arbitration and will specifically enforce
the arbitration agreement. Which law should the federal court apply to
the case? The answer must necessarily be "state law" under the doctrine
of the Erie case as that doctrine has been developed by Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York 8 and Angel v. Bullington.8 7 This must be so because other-
wise the outcome of the litigation in the federal court might be "substan-
tially different" from the outcome in the state court. First, the case in
the federal court would result in a refusal to try any of the matters
referable to arbitration under the contract. The result in the state court
82 Frankfurter, 3., in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101, 108, 109 (1945).
83 Id. at 109.
84 The Erie case was decided April 25, 1938. The Federal Rules were promulgated in
December, 1937, and became effective September 16, 1938.
85 See note 22 supra.
86 See note 82 supra.
87 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
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would be to try all those matters in defiance of the agreement to arbitrate.
Second, the referable issues in the federal court's lawsuit would be tried
and determined by arbitrators in utter disregard of legal rules as those
rules may determine the outcome of a dispute." In the state court, the
court would try and would determine all those issues in strict compliance
with those legal rules, including burden of proof, res judicata, competency
of witnesses, admissibility of testimony, sufficiency of evidence, and
others. Burden of proof, competency of witnesses, and admissibility of
testimony are deemed so important in non-arbitration cases that they
are held to be "substantive" 9 under Erie to avoid a "substantially
different result." A federal court order to proceed to arbitration would
directly result in an ultimate judgment based on the non-application of
these legal rules, whereas the local state court would have applied them.
If, in a non-arbitration case, it is thought that an application of a different
legal rule on burden of proof, et al., than the state court would have
applied might bring about a different result, then, a fortiori, an order
resulting in the failure to apply any rule at all on burden of proof, et al.,
would bring about a different result. And this is what would occur in the
type of case posed above. The same reasoning would seem to apply if
the situation were reversed, i.e., if the state law made arbitration agree-
ments irrevocable, but the federal law did not. In such case it would be
the federal court which would try all the issues and apply all applicable
rules, whereas in the state action those issues would have been tried
by arbitrators without applying any legal rules. It is submitted that the
language of Justice Frankfurter in the Guaranty Trust case, last quoted
above, could be rephrased without taking any liberties with its spirit or
intent as follows (new matter in brackets):
... the [ultimate] outcome of the litigation [begun] in the federal court
should be substantially the same, so far as [the application or non-
application of] legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it
would be if [begun or] tried in a state court.90
The opinion has been expressed that the question of the revocability or
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate is "quite remote" from the Erie
requirement that federal courts duplicate state courts in diversity cases.91
88 "The arbitrators and umpire are relieved from all judicial formalities and may abstain
from following the strict rules of law." Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Ins. Co., 25 F.2d 930, 931
(9th Cir. 1928).
89 Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208 (1939); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S.
109 (1943); Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (Ist Cir. 1940); Wright v. Wilson, 154
F.2d 616 (3d Cir. 1946).
90 Guaranty Trust Co. v. New York, 326 U.S. 99 at 109 (1945).
91 Sturges and Murphy, supra note 3, at 594.
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That position seems to be based on the fact that, once enforceability of
the arbitration agreement is determined, the issues will not be adjudicated
by any court, but by the arbitrators; and that the Erie doctrine envisions
only litigations in a court, where "legal rules" of some kind will be
applied. With deference, this position cannot be supported. The
conflicting state-federal interests sought to be resolved by the Rules of
Decision Act and its Erie interpretation cannot be reduced to a mere
"state court v. federal court" rivalry in the manner stated. Rather, those
interests involve far broader conflicts: state's rights v. federal power;
a policy of uniformity v. a policy of conformity; fairness to litigants v.
unfairness to litigants. The mere fact that particular matters in dispute
are to be determined by arbitrators rather than in a "court" is not
decisive. "Results" and "outcomes" of litigations are what concern the
policy-orientation behind the Erie decision. And, if you wish, those
results and outcomes in arbitration cases will finally find their enforce-
ment in a "court" of one kind or another, either by a trial or by the
enforcement of an award rendered by arbitrators.
.Classifying the matter of the enforceability of arbitration agreement
as "substantive" for purposes of Erie is not inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's "remedy" classification in the Red Cross Line and Dreyfus
cases.92 First of all, those decisions did not involve a diversity problem;
rather, they involved a question of the constitutionality of statutes.
Secondly, whereas those cases based their classification in heavy reliance
on the New York decisions in the Meacham and Berkowitz cases, federal
courts are not bound by such state classifications under the Erie
doctrine.13 Finally, what may be "remedy" or "procedure" for other
purposes has often been held "substance" for purposes of Erie. Witness,
for example, some of the Rules of Civil Procedure,' burden of proof,9
competency of witnesses and admissibility of testimony.9°
Assuming, despite some decisions to the contrary, 7 that the present
enforcement provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act do not apply to
contracts other than those involving admiralty or commerce, could the
Congress validly amend the Act so as to make them applicable? The
92 See notes 34 and 44 supra.
93 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109
(1943).
94 See notes 10 and 11 supra (Rule 8(c)]; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949) (Rule 17(b)); Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (Rule 23(b)).
95 See note 89 supra.
96 Ibid.
97 See cases cited note 3 supra.
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position has been taken that this could be doneY8l While it is true that
Congress could validly institute a procedural machinery for the special
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate (possibly this could be done even
through a Supreme Court Rule), it is not quite so clear that at the same
time Congress could validly render all contracts to arbitrate irrevocable
and enforceable. This view would seem to ignore the fact that "arbitra-
tion" involves both a "procedure" and a "substance"-the machinery to
enforce and the revocable or irrevocable right. For the Congress to
declare that the right to revoke is abolished in all arbitration agreements
would be to expand the Commerce Clause to the breaking point. And this
is so whether one assumes that the Erie case itself involves a constitu-
tional question or not. It is suggested that the language of Judge Parker
in Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States is not to be taken lightly
in this regard:
The Senate Committee struck the word "contract" from the section [of the
Federal Act] and rewrote the language in its present form, so as to cover
only maritime transactions and transactions involving interstate and
foreign commerce. . . . This was evidently done because it was realized
that Congress had no power to legislate with respect to the validity of
contracts generally but only as to the validity of those which related to
matters subject to its control.99
Thus, it would seem that special enforcement provisions might be enacted
by Congress to enforce all arbitration agreements in the federal courts,
provided, however, that such enforcement applies only to those non-
admiralty and non-commerce agreements which would be enforceable
under applicable state law.
Assuming that there is at present no special procedural law relating
to arbitration agreements which do not comply with the Act, how would
a federal court, in a diversity suit, enforce the agreement in light of the
position herein taken that the matter of revocability is one of "substance"
under Erie v. Tompkins? Since federal district courts today are required
to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure they could not very well
apply the state's enforcement machinery. But the federal court could
come to the same result as the state court by use of its general equity
power. Thus the federal court could stay an action or an arbitration
proceeding by injunction; and it could issue a general order to proceed to
arbitration or could appoint arbitrators by issuing a decree of specific
performance. If the state enforcement statute provides (as they
98 Sturges and Murphy, supra note 3, at 584-598.
99 142 F.2d 854, 856 (4th Cir. 1944). And see, to similar effect, judge Goodrich in
Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3, 5 (3d Cir. 1943).
1953]
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
generally do) for a jury trial on the issue of the "making of the
contract", the federal court probably could not comply with that provision
since the effect thereof would be state-extension of federal equity
jurisdiction in violation of Article III of the Federal Constitution."0
But that is small loss to the parties since trial by jury in such a case is
not a constitutional right anyway.' The former reluctance by the
federal courts to enforce state statutory rights in equity is deemed to have
been swept away by Erie and the adoption of the Federal Rules.0 2
We have been told, in Angel v. Bullington,0 3 that a federal court in a
diversity case cannot in a non-federal matter give that which the state
has withheld. The converse must also be true in order to carry out the
"nub of the policy that underlies Erie v. Tompkins," viz., that which a
state gives a federal court cannot withhold, unless Congress has validly
restricted its power to do so.' ° Therefore, if the state court would
enforce an agreement to arbitrate by granting relief akin to equitable
relief, then the federal court sitting in such a non-federal diversity case
is required to do the same. The essence of diversity jurisdiction is that
federal court enforces both state law and state policy.' And this can
only be done, in respect to revocability of arbitration agreements, if the
federal court conforms to applicable state law on the matter.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Transcontinental & Western
Air, Inc. v. Koppal,0 6 may conceivably represent a trend toward the
application of state law in this field. The case involved an action by an
employee for wrongful discharge under a collective bargaining agreement.
The jurisdiction of the district court rested on diversity of citizenship
and an adequate amount in controversy.'0 7  The collective bargaining
100 Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202 (1893); McConihy v. Wright, 121 U.S. 201
(1887).
101 The Seventh Amendment does not apply to suits in equity. United States v. Louisiana,
339 U.S. 669 (1950); Yak-us v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Shields v. Thomas,
18 How. 253 (U.S. 1855).
102 Rublin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938), discussed in Moore, Commentary
on the Judicial Code 333-334 (1949).
103 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
IN See Ragan v. Merchant's Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
105 Angel v. Eullington, 330 U.S. 183 at 187 (1947).
106 345 U.S. 653 (1953).
For what may conceivably be an embryonic trend in the labor relations field generally,
see Textile Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
107 345 U.S. 656 n. 1.
The Railway Labor Act, in accordance with which the plaintiff's collective bargaining
agreement had been entered into, was held not to preclude a discharged employee from suing
for wrongful discharge under a state-recognized cause of action. 345 U.S. 653. See Moore
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630, 634, 636 (1941).
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agreement provided that no employee shall be discharged without a fair
hearing before a designated hearing officer of the company, followed by
an appeal to the company's chief operating officer, and, if necessary, to the
system board of adjustment "or, by mutual agreement, to arbitration.""'
The court did not discuss whether arbitration was substantive or proce-
dural under the Erie doctrine, although the Court did state that "the
substantive law of Missouri should determine the requirements of the
cause of action, the interpretation of the contract and the measure of
damages to be applied."'1 9 Since the plaintiff-employee had not exhausted
his contractual remedies, described above, under the collective agree-
ment, and since the law of Missouri required that "an employee must
exhaust his administrative remedies under his contract of employment
in order to sustain his cause of action in such a case,"'"0 it was held that
plaintiff had not satisfied the requirements of his cause of action:
Where the applicable law permits his [plaintiff's] recovery without'
showing his prior exhaustion of his administrative remedies, he may so
recover.... On the other hand, if the applicable local law, as in Missouri,
requires an employee to exhaust his administrative remedies under- his
employment contract in order to sustain his cause of action- he must
show that he has done so. 
m1 1
In a previous decision, Moore v. Illinois Central R.R.,"'2 the Court had
stated that there was no need to exhaust the administrative remedies in
a collective agreement entered into in Mississippi. The Court in the
Moore case did not refer to Mississippi law, but the later decision in the
Transcontinental case announced that Mississippi law had' been applied
in the prior case.113
Although a collective agreement has been-' described as a 'form' of
legislation, rather than contract, 14 the Court iii'the Transcontinental case
treated the cause of action as one based'-upon'contract "3  Siiice' one'of
the "remedies" provided in the contract was a reference to arbitrati6n,
it may well be contended that the Court, in diveisity cases, will apply the
state law on irrevocability or revocability '0f arbitration clauses 'by in-
108 345 U.S. at 659. ' ' ' _
109 Id. at 656, 657.
110 Id. at 657, discussing Missouri authorities.
Ill Id. at 661. '"" - " '; -" : ' ..
112 312 U.S. 630 (1941), note 107' supra. ' o. '= " ' '
113 345 U.S. 661, n. 4. ' , . ,, -,
114 See Lenhoff, "The Present Status of Collective Contracts Jn, the American Legal
System," 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1109 (1941).
115 "... unlawful discharge in violation of a contiict, made 'in Missouri, to be 'performed
in Missouri and agreed by the parties to be a 'Missouri contract'." 345:US. at 656. ,_
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direction-viz., by applying the state law on "exhaustion of administrative
remedies." There is nothing in the opinion of the Supreme Court indicat-
ing that the decision was affected either by the presence of the collective
agreement or by the Railway Labor Act. By applying the state law on
"exhaustion of remedies" a federal court is enabled to avoid making an
express substantive-procedural classification of arbitration; and the arbi-
tration clause of the contract is treated no differently from any other con-
tract term, the necessity of compliance with which is determined by the
applicable state law. Necessarily, however, the very application of state
law on "exhaustion of remedies" where there is an arbitration clause has
the effect of characterizing arbitration as relating to substance. Indeed the
Court in the Transcontinental case may be deemed to have made such a
characterization unconsciously when it stated that "the substantive law
of Missouri should determine the requirements of the cause of action."'
16
The net effect of the decision was to apply state law on the revocability or
irrevocability of agreements to arbitrate; but it does not reach the
question of whether a federal court would enforce an arbitration clause
according to state law. A Supreme Court decision on the latter point
would be of great interest inasmuch as the Court would then be faced
squarely with the problem of making an express characterization of
arbitration under Erie v. Tompkins.
CONCLUSION
,It has been advocated herein that the federal courts should realign
themselves and re-classify the question of the revocability of agreements
to arbitrate as one of "substance". With deference it is urged that the
Red Cross Line case should be re-examined insofar as it held that all
elements of "arbitration" are "remedial". The Dreyfus case, on the other
hand, is defensible on the ground that its classification of "remedy"
related only to the enforcement of rights-the conferring of the power to
grant specific performance on admiralty courts. Cases in the lower
federal courts which have followed those Supreme Court decisions have
recklessly made a "remedy" classification for all purposes, and-especial-
ly in the conflict of laws cases-with quite gruesome results.
Unless the Transcontinental case, discussed above, is deemed to be an
exception, it still remains that the Supreme Court, in diversity cases,
has made no pronouncement on the proper Erie characterization to be
conferred upon arbitration where no federal law is involved. Not only
is the field for decision clear, the policy behind Erie should also make
the ultimate determination clear, viz.,,the right to revoke or not to revoke
a promise to arbitrate relates to "substance".
116 345 U.S. at 657.
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